



License to Discriminate: How a Washington Florist is 




On March 1, 2013, a man walked into a floral shop in Richland, 
Washington, intending to purchase flowers for use at his wedding.1 
Though this particular shop normally provides this service, the owner 
refused on the basis that her religious beliefs would not allow her to par-
ticipate in the man’s wedding.2 The conflict? The customer was marrying 
another man.3 
Over the past few decades, the debate over sexual orientation has 
risen to the forefront of civil rights issues. Though the focus has general-
ly been on the right to marriage, peripheral issues associated with the 
right to marriage—and with sexual orientation generally—have become 
more common in recent years. As the number of states permitting same-
sex marriage—along with states prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation—increases, so too does the conflict between pro-
viders of public accommodations and those seeking their services.4 Nev-
er is this situation more problematic than when religious beliefs are cited 
as the basis for denying services to gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender 
individuals. 
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 1. Complaint for Injunctive & Other Relief Under the Consumer Protection Act at 2, State v. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 (Benton Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/Arlenes/Complaint%202013-
04-09.pdf [hereinafter State Complaint]. 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The definition of what constitutes a public accommodation varies among jurisdictions. For 
the federal definition, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012). See also discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
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Many such cases have been addressed solely in the media or re-
solved privately between parties. In response to the Richland flower shop 
incident, however, the State of Washington took the unusual step of di-
rectly filing suit against a private company and the individual owner in 
order to enforce the state’s antidiscrimination laws.5 This is certainly not 
the first time a state has become involved in such a dispute. Hawaii,6 
New Mexico,7 and Colorado8 have all intervened in similar cases, and 
Oregon has been investigating another;9 however, Washington is the first 
state to take such direct legal action.10 Though the Washington case may 
never be resolved on its merits, it still raises a critical question not previ-
ously at issue: what happens when a state acts to suppress a right and a 
class fully protected by federal legislation and the Constitution (religion) 
in favor of a class that is only partially protected by federal law and is 
fully protected by only a handful of states (sexual orientation)? This 
question requires two answers: first, the likely outcome of the case if it 
reaches the United States Supreme Court; and second, a way to resolve 
the ensuing conflict between states offering varying levels of protection 
around sexual orientation. I conclude that the Supreme Court would like-
ly resolve the current conflict in favor of the State. Furthermore, this con-
flict demonstrates the need for consistent nationwide protection of sexual 
orientation—any lesser protection, whether at the federal level or among 
individual states, is unworkable in a civil rights context. 
Part II provides background on cases involving the three elements 
critical to this analysis: (1) discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
                                                 
 5. State Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
 6. See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief, and Damages, Cervelli v. 
Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11–1–3103–12 ECN (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 19, 2011), available at http:// 
www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/cervelli_hi_20111219_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Cervelli 
Complaint]. 
 7. See generally Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), cert. 
granted, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 2012), aff’d, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1787 (2014). 
 8. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLO., http://aclu-co.org/court-
cases/masterpiece-cakeshop/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 9. See Maxine Bernstein, Lesbian Couple Refused Wedding Cake Files State Discrimination 
Complaint, Or. Live (Aug. 14, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/gresham/index.ssf/ 
2013/08/lesbian_couple_refused_wedding.html. 
 10. Involvement by the state in both Hawaii and Colorado was through the states’ respective 
civil rights agencies and in Oregon through its Department of Labor and Industries. Although Wash-
ington has a similar agency as Hawaii and Colorado tasked with the investigation and enforcement 
of the state’s antidiscrimination laws, the Washington Attorney General has gone outside of this 
system to file suit directly without use of the administrative process. See Lornet Turnbull, Richland 
Florist Asks Court to Dismiss Attorney General’s Suit, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:32 PM), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/today/2013/10/richland-florist-asks-court-to-dismiss-attorney-generals-
suit/. 
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tion in a public accommodation setting; (2) justification on the basis of 
religious beliefs; and (3) legal action by the state to enforce its antidis-
crimination law. The first section of Part II provides a review of cases in 
Hawaii, New Mexico, and Colorado, and a brief overview of a recent 
investigation in Oregon. The second section of Part II provides a descrip-
tion of the case currently underway in Washington. Part III assesses the 
current status of federal and state antidiscrimination laws regarding sex-
ual orientation and the free exercise of religion. Additionally, it analyzes 
the competition between the two and the likely outcome of the current 
Washington case should it reach the United States Supreme Court. Part 
IV addresses the potential conflict among states resulting from a Su-
preme Court ruling in favor of the State of Washington and the need for a 
consistent nationwide legal standard that both adequately addresses the 
conflict arising in public accommodation cases and provides increased 
protection for sexual orientation. Finally, Part V concludes. 
II. STATE CASES 
A. Hawaii, New Mexico, Colorado, and Oregon 
The denial of service in a commercial setting on the basis of sexual 
orientation, though not necessarily common, is by no means limited to 
Washington State. Some of the oldest services involving public accom-
modation discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation were places of 
lodging, such as hotels and inns.11 Such services were the basis for a 
Hawaii case involving sexual orientation discrimination, religious be-
liefs, and state action.12 In 2007, a California couple sought accommoda-
tions at a Hawaii bed and breakfast, but they were refused when the 
owner discovered that the prospective customers were both women.13 
The owner refused these services on the basis of his personal religious 
views.14 Pursuant to Hawaii state law, the two women filed complaints 
with the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission—the state agency responsible 
for the enforcement of Hawaii’s antidiscrimination laws.15 Following a 
lengthy investigation, the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission found sup-
port for the couple’s discrimination claim and gave the couple permis-
                                                 
 11. For a more complete analysis specific to places of lodging, see David M. Forman, A Room 
for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy’s Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of Inhospitality in 
Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326 (2012). 
 12. Cervelli Complaint, supra note 6. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 8. 
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sion to initiate a lawsuit.16 The couple filed a private suit on December 
19, 2011, and the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission successfully moved 
to participate in the case as plaintiff-intervenor.17 The Commission, along 
with the plaintiffs, filed a joint summary judgment motion, and the court 
ruled in favor of the couple.18 
As more states allow same-sex marriages, however, the conflict be-
tween religion and sexual orientation is moving beyond places of lodging 
and into businesses that provide generic goods and services. This conflict 
became evident in 2006 after a New Mexico photographer refused to 
provide services for a same-sex wedding ceremony.19 After the New 
Mexico Human Rights Commission determined that the business had 
engaged in unlawful discrimination, the business filed a series of appeals, 
arguing at each stage that New Mexico’s antidiscrimination law violated 
the First Amendment by compelling speech and by limiting the free ex-
ercise of religion, which was also a violation of state law protecting reli-
gion.20 These appeals were unsuccessful, and the business eventually 
exhausted its options for relief in the State of New Mexico.21 On No-
vember 8, 2013, the business filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court.22 Though the case appeared to be the 
first of its kind in the Court—placing sexual orientation and religion in 
direct conflict through public accommodation law—the business dropped 
all claims pertaining to the free exercise of religion and only presented a 
compelled speech issue.23 On April 7, 2014, the Supreme Court denied 
the petition.24 
As the New Mexico photography case progressed, wedding cakes 
became a new source of conflict, as demonstrated in 2012 after a Colora-
do cake shop declined to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex cou-
                                                 
 16. Id. at 8–9. 
 17. Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-
court/cases/cervelli-v-aloha-bed-and-breakfast (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 18. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11–1–3103–12 ECN (Haw. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/2013-04-15_-_cervelli_order.pdf. 
 19. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), cert. granted, 
296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 2012), aff’d, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
 20. Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d at 59. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. 13-585 (U.S. Nov. 
8, 2013), 2013 WL 6002201 [hereinafter Elane Photography Petition for Certiorari], available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ElanePhotoCertPetition.pdf. 
 23. Id. at § i.  
 24. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
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ple.25 According to the owner, it was store policy to deny wedding-
related services to same-sex couples.26 It became clear that this was an 
established policy after the couple’s complaint led to an investigation by 
the Colorado Civil Rights Division.27 When the agency released a proba-
ble cause determination finding that discrimination had occurred, it cited 
not only the incident described in the initial case, but also three other 
instances of alleged discrimination at the same shop—two in 2012 and 
one as far back as 2005.28 Efforts to settle the case were unsuccessful, 
and the dispute moved to an administrative hearing before the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission which affirmed prior discrimination findings 
and ordered the shop to provide services regardless of sexual orienta-
tion.29 There are indications that the Colorado Office of the Attorney 
General has been involved, but not as a direct plaintiff against the cake 
shop or its owner.30 
A similar scenario is currently playing out in Oregon, where sexual 
orientation is one of eight classes protected from discrimination in places 
of public accommodation.31 In January 2013, an Oregon baker declined 
to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple on the basis of his reli-
gious beliefs—describing the situation as a religious opinion rather than 
discrimination.32 In August 2013, the would-be customer filed a com-
plaint with the Oregon Civil Rights Division—the state agency responsi-
ble for investigating discrimination allegations.33 At the time, the com-
plaint was the tenth of its kind filed in Oregon, though a case has yet to 
                                                 
 25. Charge of Discrimination, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. P2013008X (Colo. Civil 
Rights Div. Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://aclu-co.org/sites/default/files/Charge%20of%20 
Discrimination%20%282%29.pdf. 
 26. Id.; Kiela Parks & John Krieger, A Wedding Cake for Fido & Fluffy but not for Dave & 
Charlie?, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (June 4, 2013, 12:03 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/religion-
belief-lgbt-rights/wedding-cake-fido-fluffy-not-dave-charlie. 
 27. Parks & Krieger, supra note 26. 
 28. Probable Cause Determination at 2–3, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. P2013008X 
(Colo. Civil Rights Div. March 5, 2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/sites/default/files/Probable% 
20Cause%20Determination%20%282%29.pdf. 
 29. Notice of Hearing and Formal Complaint, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. P2013008X 
(Colo. Office of Admin. Ct. May 31, 2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/sites/default/files/2013-
05-31%20Notice%20of%20Charges%20%28Craig%29.pdf; Final Agency Order, No. CR 2013-
0008 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n May 30, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/assets/masterpiece_--_commissions_final_order.pdf. 
 30. See Parks & Krieger, supra note 26. 
 31. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.403 (West 2013). 
 32. Bernstein, supra note 9. 
 33. Id. Though this is technically a division of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, the 
organization functions in essentially the same way as those in Hawaii, Colorado, and Washington. 
OREGON’S CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, http://www.oregon.gov/boli/CRD/pages/index.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2014). 
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go before an administrative law judge as each complaint was settled or 
dismissed.34 The customer’s partner filed a second complaint, and the 
Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries ultimately determined that dis-
crimination had occurred; 35 private actions have not been initiated. Yet, 
this is not the only instance of such a refusal in Oregon. In May 2013, 
another couple was refused services by a baker in Hood River, Oregon, 
on the same basis—their same-sex marriage went against the religious 
beliefs of the baker.36 Where discrimination is found, the Oregon process 
calls for administrative proceedings similar to those used in Hawaii, New 
Mexico, and Colorado prior to any private litigation.37 
B. Washington 
On March 1, 2013, Robert Ingersoll entered Arlene’s Flowers in 
Richland, Washington, intending to purchase flowers for use at his wed-
ding.38 Mr. Ingersoll and his partner, Curt Freed, had been customers of 
the shop for many years, and the owner, Baronelle Stuzman, was aware 
of their sexual orientation and relationship.39 Citing her religious beliefs, 
Ms. Stuzman refused to provide the requested flowers.40 After learning 
of the incident, the State of Washington, through its Attorney General, 
filed suit against the store and its owner on April 9, 2013.41 The State’s 
complaint alleged that the refusal of services violated the Washington 
State Consumer Protection Act by way of the Washington State Civil 
Rights Act, which includes sexual orientation as a class protected from 
discrimination in places of public accommodation.42 A private suit fol-
                                                 
 34. Bernstein, supra note 9. 
 35. State Says ‘Sweet Cakes’ Discriminated Against Same-Sex Couple, KATU.COM (Jan. 17, 
2014, 5:16 AM), http://www.katu.com/news/local/State-labor-dept-says-Sweet-Cakes-discriminated-
against-same-sex-couple-240931461.html; Sweet Cakes by Melissa Faces Another Complaint, 
KATU.COM (Nov. 12, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://www.katu.com/communities/gresham/Sweet-Cakes-
by-Melissa-faces-another-complaint-lesbian-wedding-cake-231581741.html. 
 36. Dan Cassuto, Another Gay Wedding, Another Cake Denied, KOMO NEWS (May 15, 2013, 
6:42 AM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Another-gay-wedding-another-cake-denied-
207495751.html. 
 37. BOLI’s CRD Response Process, OR. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., 
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/CRD/Pages/C_CResponse.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 38. State Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 39. Id.; Complaint at 3, Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00953-3 (Benton Cnty. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2014), available at http://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Complaint 
%20-%20Intersoll%20v%20Arlene%27s%20Flowers%20%282%29.pdf [hereinafter Ingersoll Com-
plaint]. 
 40. State Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
 41. See generally State Complaint, supra note 1. 
 42. Id. at 3–4; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009). 
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lowed on April 18, 2013, alleging the same violations of the Washington 
State Civil Rights Act.43 
The case quickly garnered national attention due to the unprece-
dented action taken by the State. Like Hawaii, New Mexico, Colorado, 
and Oregon, Washington has an independent organization—the Wash-
ington Human Rights Commission—responsible for the investigation 
and initial enforcement of the state’s antidiscrimination laws.44 Follow-
ing an investigation, Commission cases enter alternative dispute resolu-
tion prior to involvement by the Office of the Attorney General.45 If the 
Attorney General becomes involved after unsuccessful conciliation by 
the Commission, the Attorney General must make further attempts at 
settlement prior to a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings.46 Overall, the process in Washington, like in other states, is one of 
administrative law—not a matter for state courts. 
Without using the Commission’s administrative process, however, 
the State of Washington independently filed suit in superior court under 
the Washington State Consumer Protection Act, which incorporates vio-
lations of the Washington State Civil Rights Act.47 This action, which 
circumvents the administrative process, is unprecedented in such litiga-
tion. Though states have acted to investigate and assist in similar cases, 
before Washington, no state has taken direct action against an individual 
and his or her religious beliefs in defense of sexual orientation. This ac-
tion prompted the defendant to file a third-party complaint on May 16, 
2013.48 Like Elane Photography, the defendant argued that Washing-
ton’s enforcement of its antidiscrimination law restricted the free exer-
cise of religion in violation of both state law and the United States Con-
stitution.49 The State’s unusual action has placed the free exercise of reli-
                                                 
 43. Ingersoll Complaint, supra note 39, at 4–5. 
 44. Investigative Process, WASH. STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, http://www.hum.wa.gov/ 
ComplaintProcess/InvestigativeProcess.html (last visited Jun. 28, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally State Complaint, supra note 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3) (2009); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961). 
 48. Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Third-Party Complaint, State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 
No. 13-2-00871-5 (Benton Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers Complaint], 
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersCountersuit.pdf. 
 49. Id. at 16–17. Although both cases contain additional First Amendment claims related to 
free exercise of religion, namely that state enforcement of antidiscrimination law improperly com-
pels speech and association that is contrary to the individual’s religious beliefs, such claims are not 
addressed in this Comment. However, it should be noted that, as previously mentioned, the com-
pelled speech claim was the sole issue raised in the Elane Photography petition for certiorari. The 
Supreme Court’s denial of the petition indicates a disinclination to disturb the ruling of the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, which limited the application of both Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
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gion—a right fully protected by the United States Constitution and by 
federal legislation—directly in conflict with sexual orientation, a class 
that currently has limited federal protection and is fully protected by only 
a handful of states. 
III. CLASS PROTECTION OF RELIGION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO 
If it eventually receives consideration from the Supreme Court, Ar-
lene’s Flowers, or a case like it, begs a novel question: How do we solve 
a public accommodation conflict between two distinct classes on consid-
erably unequal footing? The answer lies in a convoluted history of cases 
and, in the end, does not rely on an imaginary battle pitting one class 
against another. It is, however, necessary to understand each class and 
how each is protected in order to understand the nature of the conflict 
and its resolution. Such protection can occur at both the state and federal 
levels, and protection at each level can come from a variety of sources 
including constitutions, legislative acts, and judicial decisions. Within 
judicial decisions, the level of protection is determined by which of the 
three tiers of scrutiny common to class discrimination claims is applied: 
strict scrutiny,50 intermediate scrutiny,51 or rational-basis review.52 How 
these tiers of scrutiny and other forms of protection apply in a case such 
as Arlene’s Flowers requires consideration not only of religion and sexu-
                                                                                                             
Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000)—the two leading cases for limitations on compelled speech in a private organization. Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). As a result, it 
would appear that at this time, the protection afforded by Hurley and Dale does not necessarily apply 
to compelled speech or association claims made by “an ordinary public accommodation . . . that sells 
goods and services to the public.” Id. at 66. 
 50. “Strict scrutiny” requires a compelling government interest and a law that is narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 51. “Intermediate scrutiny” requires an important government interest and a law that is sub-
stantially related to that interest. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 52. “Rational-basis review” requires a legitimate government interest and a law that is reason-
ably related to that interest. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Arguments have been made 
that a fourth tier may exist, commonly referred to as ‘“rational-basis with bite.” Kevin H. Lewis, 
Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other 
Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 180 (1997). This tier theoretically falls somewhere between rational-
basis review and intermediate scrutiny and has occurred in cases where the Supreme Court applied 
rational-basis review, but inquired into the government interest in a way that looked more like inter-
mediate level scrutiny. Id. As of now, this more searching review has appeared in cases regarding 
sexual orientation and disability. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 2716–17 (Alito, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 
(2003) (O’Conner, J., concurring); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459–60 
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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al orientation as discrete classes, but of public accommodation law as 
well. 
A. Public Accommodation Law and the Protection of Classes 
1. Public Accommodation Law 
Generally, Title II of the Civil Rights Act governs federal public 
accommodation antidiscrimination law.53 Title II currently provides full 
protection against public accommodation discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin.54 Additionally, the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990, includes disability as a pro-
tected class in public accommodation antidiscrimination law.55 Though 
additional federal legislation has provided protection for other classes, 
these efforts have been largely directed at preventing employment dis-
crimination, and none have extended public accommodation protections 
to other classes. 
2. Class Protection for Religious Beliefs 
Individual religious beliefs have long been protected by the First 
Amendment, which bars the federal government from prohibiting the 
free exercise of religion.56 In 1940, this protection was incorporated 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby 
applying the same prohibition to the states.57 Furthermore, religion is one 
of the classes protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 This right, 
however, is not unlimited, especially when religious belief becomes reli-
gious conduct.59 Perhaps the clearest line the Court drew on this matter 
occurred in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court held that 
generally applicable laws were not unconstitutional even though they 
may impact religious conduct.60 The Court reasoned that the govern-
                                                 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012). 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 57. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
 59. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
 60. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). “[T]he right of free exercise does not re-
lieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).’” Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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ment’s ability to prohibit conduct that is harmful to society cannot de-
pend on the “spiritual development” of an individual.61 
To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contin-
gent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except 
where the State’s interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by 
virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,”—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.62 
In doing so, the Court pulled away from the strict scrutiny standard it had 
previously applied to the free exercise of religion as a fundamental right 
and instituted a standard that was essentially rational-basis.63 
The Court’s analysis of such “generally applicable” laws was, how-
ever, short-lived. In direct response to the Court’s decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993 (RFRA).64 The law reinstated the requirement of a 
“compelling government interest,” even for generally applicable laws, 
when an individual’s exercise of religion is substantially burdened.65 
Though it was initially written to cover both federal and state laws bur-
dening religion, it is important to note that the RFRA no longer applies to 
the states. The Supreme Court declared such application unconstitutional 
in City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997,66 and the RFRA was amended to re-
move the language applying the Act to state laws in 2000.67 In its City of 
Boerne analysis, the Court adhered to the Employment Division v. Smith 
rationale for analyzing state laws that impact the free exercise of reli-
gion: laws that are neutral and generally applicable are not unconstitu-
tional unless another constitutional protection is implicated.68 
                                                 
 61. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 
439, 451 (1988)). 
 62. Id. (citation omitted). 
 63. Id. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2000). 
 66. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2000), as recognized in Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 827, 830 (8th 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom Olsen v. Holder, 556 U.S. 1221 (2009). It is for this reason that a 
decision such as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), addressing the federal 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, has no impact on the analysis herein. 
 68. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. Freedom of 
speech and of association are two such protections that will be afforded strict scrutiny analysis in the 
face of a neutral and generally applicable law that incidentally burdens the free exercise of religion. 
Id. Such cases are frequently referred to as “hybrid” claims. Id. 
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At the state level, nineteen states have passed their own versions of 
the RFRA, most of which closely mirror the federal version.69 That is not 
to say, however, that states without an RFRA leave religion with a lower 
level of protection. Washington, for example, does not have an RFRA to 
provide statutory protection, but it has a longstanding judicial require-
ment of a “compelling government interest.”70 Therefore, Arlene’s Flow-
ers would face a future of complex appellate litigation where alleged vio-
lations of the state constitution would be governed by the strict scrutiny 
standard, requiring a compelling state interest. However, alleged viola-
tions of the Constitution would depend on the issues raised by the ap-
pealing party: a singular claim regarding the free exercise of religion 
would face rational-basis review, while a hybrid claim would face strict 
scrutiny. 
3. Class Protection for Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
At this time, sexual orientation as a characteristic or class receives 
almost no protection at the federal level, either by congressional act or 
judicial standard of scrutiny, for any reason.71 Only recently was an ex-
ecutive order signed providing protection from employment discrimina-
tion.72 At the state level, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia 
currently provide public accommodation protection for sexual orienta-
tion.73 Seventeen of these jurisdictions protect both sexual orientation 
and gender identity, while five protect sexual orientation only.74 An addi-
tional nine states provide protection for gender identity, sexual orienta-
tion, or both in public employment, but do not extend this protection to 
public accommodations.75 The remaining states provide no protection for 
                                                 
 69. Sarah Torre, Religious Freedom Wins in Mississippi, DAILY SIGNAL (Apr. 9, 2014), 
http://dailysignal.com/2014/04/09/religious-freedom-wins-mississippi/. 
 70. First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam’r for Seattle Landmarks Pres. 
Bd., 916 P.2d 374 (1996). Under the Washington State Constitution protection of religion, “the 
complaining party must first prove the government action has a coercive effect on the practice of 
religion. Once a coercive effect is established, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show 
the restrictions serve a compelling state interest and are the least restrictive means for achieving the 
government objective. If no compelling state interest exists, the restrictions are unconstitutional.” Id. 
(citing First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1357 (1992)). 
 71. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 72. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014). 
 73. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information—Map, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Apr. 
11, 2014). While gender identity is not technically at issue in this Comment, the distinction illus-
trates the extent of the existing discrepancy among states even when there is some level of protec-
tion. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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sexual orientation.76 Thus, as it stands, there is a considerable difference 
in how sexual orientation discrimination is treated from one state to the 
next. 
B. Resolving the Conflict Between Religion and Sexual Orientation 
Should Arlene’s Flowers, or a case like it, reach the Supreme Court, 
resolving the conflict between the free exercise of religion and the pro-
tection of sexual orientation will be nearly impossible to avoid, as the 
case will necessarily involve religion on some level.77 Though the con-
flict playing out in Arlene’s Flowers appears, on its face, to be a conflict 
between religion, sexual orientation, and the class protection afforded to 
each, such a characterization ignores the legal analysis at play. A por-
trayal of the conflict as one between two distinct classes of individuals, 
one highly protected and the other generally unprotected, would appear 
to lend itself to the conclusion that the highly protected class must pre-
vail. This is inconsistent, however, with the way that American jurispru-
dence approaches state efforts to protect its citizens from discrimina-
tion.78 In reality, the conflict is between religion and the enforcement of 
the state’s antidiscrimination laws, under which sexual orientation is a 
protected class.79 This is a subtle, yet key, distinction. Although this shift 
in analysis does not change the way in which religion is protected, it does 
alter the way in which the courts view sexual orientation: sexual orienta-
tion is one among a number of characteristics that the state has declared 
to be collectively protected through its antidiscrimination law, rather than 
a discrete characteristic or class. It is this government interest—the elim-
ination of discrimination—which the Supreme Court would weigh 
against the free exercise of religion. 
From the beginning of the civil rights era and through the expan-
sion of equal rights, the Supreme Court has continually upheld the inter-
est states have in eliminating discrimination, especially in the public ac-
                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Elane Photography demonstrated the impossibility of removing the religion element from 
any speech or association claim, even if free exercise of religion was not technically at issue. See 
generally Elane Photography Petition for Certiorari, supra note 22. This is due to the fact that speech 
and association are only compelled because they conflict with a religious belief, thus there is no way 
to completely separate religion from the analysis. The same issue would occur in Arlene’s Flowers, 
where a petition to the Supreme Court could only realistically consist of free exercise of a religion 
claim alone or a hybrid claim. 
 78. See generally Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
 79. See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. 609; Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574; Gay Rights Coal. of 
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d 1. 
2014] License to Discriminate 119 
commodation context. Speaking broadly, the Supreme Court has stated 
that a state’s “commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its 
citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services . . . plainly 
serves compelling state interests of the highest order.”80 The substantial 
deference given to such laws trumps even the most protected constitu-
tional interests, such as the freedoms of speech and association, because 
“acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available 
goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government 
has a compelling interest to prevent—wholly apart from the point of 
view such conduct may transmit.”81 This standard has generally held true 
even when the state interest is in conflict with the free exercise of reli-
gion by an individual or organization.82 If Arlene’s Flowers is brought to 
the Supreme Court as a free exercise claim alone, the rational-basis 
standard articulated in Employment Division v. Smith would apply, and 
the state’s compelling interest in enforcing its antidiscrimination law 
ought to prevail. 
The Court’s application of this deferential standard is less certain in 
hybrid cases involving both the free exercise of religion and freedom of 
speech.83 Such cases pose a unique problem: individuals who object to 
providing services on religious grounds perceive a risk that any action 
compelled by antidiscrimination laws will be publicly interpreted as an 
endorsement of a message that the individual considers undesirable.84 
However, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the free-
dom to hold certain religious beliefs and opinions and the freedom to act 
on those beliefs.85 Though the former is considered an absolute right, 
“[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society,”86 
and legislation “may reach people’s actions when they are found to be in 
violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even 
                                                 
 80. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624. 
 81. Id. at 628. 
 82. See generally Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (Christian university could not base racially 
discriminatory policies on religious beliefs); Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 
A.2d 1 (Catholic university could not base denial of benefits to “gay student organizations” on reli-
gious beliefs); McCready v. Hoffius, 459 Mich. 131 (1998), vacated in part by McCready v. 
Hoffius, 459 Mich. 1235 (1999) (landlord could not base refusal to rent to an unmarried couple on 
religious beliefs). But see State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (holding that refusal to rent to 
an unmarried couple on religious basis was not a violation of Minnesota antidiscrimination law 
because protection of “marital status” did not include unmarried couples based on statutory interpre-
tation). 
 83. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). 
 84. See Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 11–13. See also Arlene’s 
Flowers Complaint, supra note 48, at 12. 
 85. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
 86. Id. 
120 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:107 
when the actions are demanded by one’s religion.”87 It is in this distinc-
tion that claims such as those made in Arlene’s Flowers must necessarily 
fail. Though a business owner may consider same-sex marriage to be 
offensive to their religious beliefs, and any assistance to such a marriage 
specifically proscribed, any action on those beliefs that results in the un-
equal treatment of others, based solely on their sexual orientation, would 
necessarily violate the important social duty and good order upon which 
antidiscrimination laws are based. As a result, even if Arlene’s Flowers 
is brought to the Supreme Court as a hybrid claim and strict scrutiny is 
applied, the state’s interest in enforcing its antidiscrimination law would 
likely prevail.88 
Considering Supreme Court precedent and the current state of the 
free exercise of religion in the public accommodation law context, the 
resolution of Arlene’s Flowers would presumably favor the State of 
Washington. As a direct result, Arlene’s Flowers, and other businesses 
like it in Washington, would be prohibited from refusing service to same-
sex couples on the basis of religious beliefs. The broader result would be 
that states incorporating sexual orientation as a protected class in their 
public accommodation laws would be permitted to enforce such laws in 
spite of the religiously motivated objections of businesses. While this 
solves the immediate conflict for Washington and similar states, it cre-
ates a larger problem on the national level—the unequal application of 
antidiscrimination laws due to the differing standards among states. 
IV. THE CASE FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
A. The Need for a National Standard 
Much of what has been said to this point is hypothetical. Arlene’s 
Flowers may be dismissed on procedural grounds, the parties may de-
cline to pursue appellate remedies for federal constitutional claims, or the 
Supreme Court may decline to hear the case or may alter its rationale and 
allow business owners to not comply with state antidiscrimination laws 
on the basis of religious belief. But in the face of so much uncertainty, 
the existing litigation regarding sexual orientation—whether on a mar-
                                                 
 87. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603–04 (1961). 
 88. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 921, 929 (Cal. 1996), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997) (holding, in a public accommodation case where the existence of a 
hybrid right was argued, that the hybrid claim was irrelevant because the state antidiscrimination 
statute did not amount to a substantial burden, thus upholding the law and ending the analysis before 
the compelling interest test could be applied). 
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riage or public accommodation basis—makes one fact inescapable: cases 
like Arlene’s Flowers will continue until a national legal standard exists. 
The need for a national legal standard arises primarily from the im-
plications of interstate commerce. This concern has a long history of 
support dating back to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States.89 There, the Supreme Court held that the purpose 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of per-
sonal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’”90 The discrimination present in that case (denying hotel 
accommodation) was shown to substantially impede interstate travel, 
which was within the power of Congress to regulate.91 In recent years, 
same-sex couples have faced the exact same type of discrimination pre-
sent in Heart of Atlanta Motel.92 That alone is a sufficient basis for a na-
tional standard of protection, yet the imbalance among state anti-
discrimination laws makes the case even clearer. Due to the varied sup-
port for same-sex marriage, many couples that are domiciled in states 
prohibiting same-sex marriage travel to permissive states for ceremonies 
while seeking goods and services along the way.93 As a result, the dis-
crimination directed at same-sex couples, such as that seen in Arlene’s 
Flowers and other similar cases, directly impacts interstate commerce 
through same-sex couples who engage in interstate travel to marry, vaca-
tion, or do business. The substantial impediment to such travel, which 
results from inconsistent protection for sexual orientation, demonstrates 
the need for a consistent legal standard—one which will adequately ad-
dress the conflict and the rights at issue. Therefore, only one question 
remains: Which standard is appropriate? 
B. Sexual Orientation and the Current Standard of Review 
The most recent word from the Supreme Court on this matter, per-
haps more aptly classified as silence, came in 2013 in United States v. 
Windsor.94 The case involved a challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), a section of which was eventually struck down as a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment.95 Although the Court’s analysis avoided an out-
                                                 
 89. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 90. Id. at 250. 
 91. Id. at 253, 255. 
 92. See generally Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11–1–3103–12 ECN (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 19, 2011). 
 93. Marriage, however, is not a prerequisite to such discrimination. See Cervelli Complaint, 
supra note 6. 
 94. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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right declaration of the applicable level of scrutiny for sexual orientation 
cases, the opinion is consistent with rational-basis review, a point the 
dissenting opinions were quick to point out.96 Though this standard of 
review would appear to hinder any efforts to obtain protection for sexual 
orientation, the case appears to have largely had the opposite effect.97 
Ultimately, the protection determination will be up to the Supreme Court, 
but lower courts, both those in United States v. Windsor and those basing 
their decisions on its outcome, have weighed in on the matter.98 Where 
an analysis of heightened scrutiny has been undertaken, courts heavily 
favor intermediate level scrutiny.99 
C. Finding an Appropriate Standard 
1. Revisiting the High and the Low: Strict Scrutiny and Rational-Basis 
Review 
Strict scrutiny—perhaps desirable as the holy grail of judicial pro-
tection—is a difficult standard to justify for sexual orientation. First, 
sexual orientation is not considered a fundamental right, unlike many of 
the categories of cases in which strict scrutiny is applied. Second, while 
sexual orientation has little or no instrumental relevance to many poten-
tial government regulations, it is still conceivable that there could be 
some relevant regulations on the same grounds as gender, rather than the 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 2716–17 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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 99. See generally Windsor, 699 F.3d 169; De Leon, F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
2014] License to Discriminate 123 
complete lack of relevance found in classes such as race and national 
origin.100 As a result, strict scrutiny makes for an ill-fitting standard. 
On the other end of the scrutiny spectrum, rational-basis review and 
the theoretical “rational-basis with bite” make for equally ill-fitting 
standards. The latter is easily dismissed; “rational-basis with bite” has 
yet to be acknowledged as an independent standard and provides no ad-
ditional class protection beyond that of rational-basis review.101 Howev-
er, Arlene’s Flowers, in addition to the similar cases in Hawaii, New 
Mexico, Colorado, and Oregon, demonstrate the inadequacy of tradition-
al rational-basis review. The continued application of this low standard 
in sexual orientation cases leaves an opening for such conflicts as well as 
for broad discrepancies in the way that states treat gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
or transgender individuals. Such discrepancies implicate interstate com-
merce and equal protection concerns that will remain at issue until a con-
sistent legal standard is achieved, thereby providing a means by which to 
review sexual orientation cases for more than a mere “legitimate gov-
ernment interest.” 
2. The Appropriate Standard: Intermediate Scrutiny & Sexual Orienta-
tion 
The search for a workable standard, therefore, leads us to analyze 
the appropriateness of intermediate level scrutiny. The Supreme Court 
has never set forth a definitive test for when it will apply intermediate 
level scrutiny; however, there are four distinct factors taken from dec-
ades of application that are generally considered in determining whether 
a class is deserving of such heightened scrutiny.102 First, the Supreme 
Court has considered whether the class in question is one that has histori-
cally “been subjected to discrimination.”103 Second, whether the class is 
defined by a characteristic that “frequently bears no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society.”104 Third, whether the class members 
“exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define 
                                                 
 100. Though it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which sexual orientation would be 
instrumentally relevant to a government regulation, thus implicating the strict scrutiny standard, 
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consistent with gender-based protection. 
 101. See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); City of 
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them as a discrete group.”105 Finally, the Court considers whether it is “a 
minority or politically powerless” class.106 
Various courts have undertaken the application of these factors to 
sexual orientation cases in recent years, primarily because of challenges 
to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.107 In such cases, courts have con-
sistently found that all four factors favor application of the intermediate 
standard.108 As to the first factor, historical discrimination, courts have 
typically focused on past criminalization of homosexual behavior, exclu-
sion from federal employment and even the country as a whole, and pre-
sumptions of mental infirmity.109 The second factor, performance in so-
ciety, is largely dismissed as not being a matter of debate as there is 
nothing to suggest that sexual orientation has any impact on performance 
or aptitude.110 The third factor, an immutable characteristic, is one that 
has generated much debate, yet the Supreme Court has previously 
acknowledged sexual orientation to be “fundamental to a person’s identi-
ty.”111 Additionally, courts have noted that little scientific debate remains 
as to the immutability of sexual orientation as a characteristic.112 Finally, 
as to the fourth factor, political power, courts have noted that homosexu-
al individuals, despite increased political power in recent decades, con-
tinue to face difficulties in protecting themselves from discriminatory 
policies resulting from a “majoritarian political process.”113 Considering 
these four factors together, it is clear that sexual orientation, as a class, is 
deserving of intermediate level scrutiny, while the conflicting protection 
among states demonstrates the need to apply this protection at a con-
sistent, national level. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Though the intent was surely never there, a little shop called Ar-
lene’s Flowers has made a strong case for the heightened protection of 
sexual orientation on a national level. This case is a prime example of the 
current, inevitable conflict between same-sex couples seeking services 
                                                 
 105. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See generally Windsor, 699 F.3d 169; De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 650–52 
(W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 108. See generally Windsor, 699 F.3d 169; De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
 109. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182; De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
 110. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182–83; De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
 111. De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 
(2003)). 
 112. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183–84; De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
 113. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184. See also De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 650–52. 
 
2014] License to Discriminate 125 
and proprietors who would withhold them on the basis of their religious 
beliefs. Due to the unprecedented direct involvement of the State of 
Washington, Arlene’s Flowers is a likely candidate for federal review 
where others have been unsuccessful. Based on the current state of juris-
prudence governing conflicts between the free exercise of religion and 
state antidiscrimination laws, the Supreme Court would likely uphold the 
state law, thereby allowing the enforcement of such laws despite the reli-
gious objections of businesses. The broader result of such a ruling would 
be to magnify the disparate protection of sexual orientation among the 
states, a conflict that can only be resolved by the application of a con-
sistent national standard of protection. Precedent for such protection is 
easily traced to the civil rights era, where discrimination by private busi-
nesses was prohibited in precisely the same circumstances and for the 
same commercial reasons implicated by current sexual orientation dis-
crimination. As a result, a national standard of intermediate level scrutiny 
for sexual orientation is necessary to resolve the discrepancy among state 
levels of protection, to address interstate commerce concerns, and to ad-
equately protect the rights of all individuals regardless of sexual orienta-
tion. 
 
